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ABSTRACT 
 
MATTHEW RINGGENBERG: When Short Sellers Agree to Disagree: Short Sales, 
Volatility, and Heterogeneous Beliefs. 
(Under the direction of Adam Reed) 
 
 Using a novel database that contains information on the quantity of shares demanded 
and supplied in the equity lending market, I test a previously unexplored implication that 
follows from models of heterogeneous beliefs: the idea that short sales lead to increased 
volatility because they alter the supply of shares in the market.  Because short sales and 
returns are endogenously determined, I use an instrumental variables framework to identify 
their relation.  Specifically, I use shifts in the lendable supply of shares to identify the impact 
that short sales have on both the level and volatility of returns and I find evidence that short 
sales lead to higher contemporaneous volatility.  Moreover, I find that this effect is strongest 
when demand curves are more likely to be downward sloping as a result of heterogeneous 
beliefs, a finding consistent with the predictions of heterogeneous belief models.  In other 
words, I find that when there is disagreement among investors, the trades of short sellers lead 
to increased volatility.  
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1. Introduction 
Following the short sales ban that occurred during the financial crisis of 2008 there is 
an increased desire to understand the impact that short sales have on the formation of asset 
prices.
1
  While there is a well-established literature examining the relation between short 
sales and returns, relatively little is known about the relation between short sales and 
volatility.  In this paper, I present new empirical evidence on the relation between short sales, 
returns, and volatility by isolating the impact of supply shocks that result from short sales.  
Because short sales involve borrowing a share from an existing investor and selling it to a 
new investor, the opening of a short position effectively leads to an increase in the supply of 
shares.  While early asset pricing models assume perfectly elastic demand curves, a number 
of studies have suggested that asset supply can impact returns.
2
  However, few studies have 
examined the supply shocks that result from short sales.  As a result, several important 
questions remain unanswered: Do the supply shocks that result from short sales impact 
returns?  If so, do these supply shocks lead to increased volatility as short positions are 
opened and closed? 
                                                 
1
Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putninš (2010) examine market conditions around short sales and find that short 
sellers can be important providers of liquidity.  Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009) examine the impact of the 
2008 short sales ban and find evidence that banned stocks had worse liquidity than a matched sample of non-
banned stocks. 
 
2
For example, Shleifer (1986) examines stocks that have been added to the S&P 500 index and finds evidence 
of downward sloping market demand curves.  Because index funds are likely to purchase stocks that have been 
added to the S&P 500 index, the announcement of the index inclusion leads to an outward shift in the demand 
curve.  Shleifer documents significant positive abnormal returns following these demand shocks, a finding 
consistent with downward sloping market demand curves.  Bagwell (1992) analyzes individual shareholder bids 
in 32 Dutch auction share repurchases and finds that shareholder valuations are heterogeneous; she concludes 
that the assumption of perfectly elastic demand curves is unlikely to be a valid approximation of actual demand 
schedules. 
2 
 
Using an instrumental variables framework in tandem with a unique database that 
contains the quantity of shares demanded and supplied in the equity lending market, I isolate 
the impact of supply shocks that result from short sales.  Specifically, I use shifts in the 
lendable supply of shares to identify the effect that short sales have on the level and volatility 
of returns; the results suggest that short sales lead to increased volatility.  In addition, I find 
evidence that this relation is a consequence of downward sloping market demand curves as 
predicted by models of heterogeneous investor beliefs including Miller (1977) and Mayshar 
(1983).  Overall, the results suggest that heterogeneous investor beliefs do have an influence 
on asset prices and that short sales do exhibit a causal impact on the volatility of returns.  In 
other words, I find that when short sellers agree to disagree with other investors, their trades 
lead to increased volatility. 
Academic studies have found evidence of a number of mechanisms that link short 
sales and returns.
3
  Several papers have found evidence suggesting that short sellers are able 
to identify stocks that are more likely to experience negative returns (e.g., Boehmer, Jones, 
and Zhang (2008), (2010); Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2010)).  Moreover, a number 
of papers have found that information about the quantity of short selling reveals private 
information that in turn causes other investors to reconsider their own valuation (e.g., 
Senchack and Starks (1993); Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998)).  Even so, many 
investors and market commentators believe that short sellers are able to drive down prices 
and even cause market crashes, an idea that implies short sellers can cause prices to depart 
                                                 
3
A large literature has examined the relation between short sales and returns using returns as the dependent 
variable in a regression on short volume or short interest.  However, because short sales and returns are both 
endogenous to the market, these regressions are unable to test for a causal relation.  This study is the first 
attempt that I am aware of to specifically test for a relation between short sales and returns that is independent 
of investor preferences and the latent flow of information. 
3 
 
from their fundamental values.
4
  While a number of studies have found that short sales 
improve price discovery and market quality, the supply shocks examined in this study 
represent one possible explanation for the belief that short sales can cause prices to depart 
from fundamentals. 
Knowledge about the mechanisms that relate short sales, investor beliefs, and returns 
is crucial to understanding how asset prices are determined in equilibrium.  Standard asset 
pricing models often require non-trivial assumptions about the belief set possessed by 
investors and the ability of investors to short an asset.  For instance, the standard capital asset 
pricing model (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965)) assumes that all investors have homogeneous 
expectations about the risk and return of every security.  Similarly, contingent claim based 
asset pricing models (e.g., Rubinstein (1976), Breeden and Litzenberger (1978)) often 
assume that investors agree on the probability distribution of aggregate consumption levels.  
However, a number of theoretical models have argued that heterogeneous investor beliefs do 
impact asset prices.  In particular, Miller (1977), Mayshar (1983), Varian (1985), and Hong 
and Stein (2003), among others, have all argued that heterogeneous investor beliefs play an 
important role in the formation of asset prices. 
In both the Miller (1977) and the Mayshar (1983) models, investor participation in the 
market for each stock is endogenous and it is assumed that investors possess differing 
opinions about each stock‟s return.  When short selling is restricted or costly, only the most 
optimistic investors will choose to participate in the market and so each stock will tend to be 
held by the investors with the highest valuations.  As a result, in Miller‟s model the market 
demand curve for each stock will be downward sloping and the equilibrium price will be 
                                                 
4For example, in September of 2008 the SEC said, “At present, it appears that unbridled short selling is 
contributing to the recent, sudden price declines in the securities of financial institutions unrelated to true price 
valuation.” 
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determined by the marginal valuation.
5
  An interesting implication of these models is that, 
given a downward sloping demand curve, a change in the supply of shares will lead to a 
change in the marginal valuation which, in turn, results in a contemporaneous price change 
that is independent of the information environment.  Thus, heterogeneous opinion models 
provide a theoretical basis for the commonly held belief that short sales can cause stock 
returns to change.
6
   
 In this paper, I present a direct empirical test of this theorized relation between short 
sales and returns.  One complication to any test of this theory, however, is the fact that short 
sales are unlikely to occur for reasons that are exogenous from either the level or the 
volatility of returns.  For example, short sellers are likely to initiate a short position when 
they believe a stock is overvalued and future returns are likely to be negative.
7
  Thus, in order 
to test for a causal relation between short sales and returns, I turn to a two-stage instrumental 
variables framework.  Specifically, I use the quantity of shares available to be borrowed (i.e., 
the loan supply) as an instrument to identify the impact of short sales.  D‟Avolio (2002) 
provides motivation for the use of loan supply as an instrument; he notes that equity lending 
desks are often run separately from portfolio allocation desks, and as a result, the short-term 
loan supply is likely exogenous from returns.  In order to measure loan supply and the 
quantity of shares sold short, I use a proprietary dataset from Data Explorers, a leading 
provider of data in the equity lending market.  The data is sourced from a wide variety of 
                                                 
5Mayshar‟s model is more complicated because the equilibrium price depends on both the level of expectations 
and the diversity of opinion and he explicitly considers the relation between asset prices and both the average 
and the marginal investor, while Miller focuses only on the marginal investor.  However, Mayshar shows that 
under certain conditions, his model leads to the same conclusions as the Miller model. 
 
6
While the impact of short sales on the supply of shares is not directly modeled in the heterogeneous beliefs 
literature, Miller (1977) acknowledges that, “...short selling increases the effective supply.” 
 
7
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a significant amount of short volume also occurs due to hedging demands 
that are not necessarily related to returns. 
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market participants including hedge funds, prime brokers, and investment banks and the data 
contains information on the quantity of shares demanded and supplied in the equity lending 
market at the daily frequency.   
Using loan supply as an instrument, I find that a one standard deviation increase in 
the quantity of shares on loan is associated with a negative 10.94 basis point change in daily 
returns.  The results suggest that short sales change the effective supply of shares and, as a 
result, they change the level of returns.  Heterogeneous belief models, including Miller 
(1977), suggest that market demand curves are downward sloping as a result of divergence in 
investor opinions.  As these opinions become more diverse, the market demand curve will 
become steeper.  Accordingly, the impact of supply shocks caused by short selling should be 
stronger when investor beliefs are more disperse.  Using dispersion in analyst estimates as a 
proxy for divergence in investor opinions, I find that the relation between short sales and 
returns is strongest when market demand curves are more steeply downward sloping.  For 
firms in the highest quintile of divergence in opinions, I find that a one standard deviation 
increase in the quantity of shares on loan is associated with a negative 27.58 basis point 
change in daily returns. 
The evidence suggests that the opening of a short position results in a positive supply 
shock that impacts returns; however, the closing of a short position results in an identically 
sized negative supply shock.  Thus, as short positions are opened and closed, the supply 
curve will shift in and out and the net effect of a short transaction may lead to increased 
volatility.  Using an instrumental variables framework in combination with the 
Heterogeneous Autoregressive Realized Volatility (HAR-RV) class of volatility models as in 
Corsi (2009) and Andersen, Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007), I find evidence that short sales 
6 
 
lead to increased contemporaneous volatility.  Specifically, a one standard deviation increase 
in short sales is associated with an increase in daily log realized volatility of 1.83%.  
Moreover, as predicted by models of heterogeneous beliefs, this relation is strongest when 
divergence of opinion is highest. 
Overall, the findings of this paper contribute to three different strands of the existing 
literature.  First, the paper adds to the empirical evidence on the shape of the demand curve 
for stocks and finds evidence that market demand curves do in fact slope downward.  
Second, the paper confirms existing results that find a relation between heterogeneous 
investor beliefs and equity returns and moreover, it provides novel empirical evidence on 
how heterogeneous expectations influence returns and influence the shape of the market 
demand curve.  Finally, the paper provides new empirical evidence on the relation between 
short sales and both the level and volatility of equity returns. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
existing literature.  Section 3 describes the theoretical mechanisms that relate short sales, 
heterogeneous beliefs, and returns and provides an overview of the methodology used to test 
these theories.  Section 4 describes the data and discusses the calculation of key variables.  
Section 5 presents the analyses and findings.  Section 6 concludes. 
  
  
 
 
 
2. The Relation between Short Sales, Investor Beliefs, and Equity Returns 
This paper sits at the intersection of two different but often related strands of the 
extant literature.  First, this paper contributes to the growing body of research investigating 
the role that short sales play in financial markets.  Second, this paper is related to theoretical 
models on the role played by heterogeneous investor beliefs in the formation of asset prices.  
In this section, I provide an overview of the existing literature in each of these areas and I 
outline the theoretical relation between short sales, heterogeneous investor beliefs, and the 
level and volatility of equity returns. 
 
2.1 Short Sales and the Level of Returns 
There is a large literature examining the relation between short sales and the level of 
equity returns.  In one of the first studies to formally examine the relation between short sales 
and equity returns, Seneca (1967) outlines two competing theories on the impact of short 
sales and finds that short interest is negatively related to future prices.  Subsequently, a 
number of papers have confirmed the negative relation between short sales and future 
returns.  Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) use institutional ownership as a proxy for short 
sale constraints and find that the negative relation between short interest and future returns is 
strongest when firms are more likely to experience short sale constraints.  Cohen, Diether, 
and Malloy (2007) isolate shifts in the supply and demand for shorting using data from a 
large institutional investor and they find that increases in shorting demand are associated 
with negative future returns.  In fact, a number of existing papers find evidence consistent 
8 
 
with the common belief that short sales lead to lower returns.  However, to date, little work 
has been done to explore the idea that short sales impact returns specifically because they 
alter the supply of shares in the market.  Thus, even though a number of papers have found 
evidence of a negative relation between short sales and returns, it is unclear if short sellers 
are causing lower returns or if they are merely better able to identify which firms are likely to 
experience lower returns. 
Given the documented relation between short sales and negative future returns, a 
number of papers have theorized that short sellers are better informed than the general 
population of investors.  Several papers have found evidence suggesting that short sellers are 
better able to predict which stocks will experience negative returns.  Boehmer, Jones, and 
Zhang (2008) examine NYSE order data from 2000 – 2004 and find that short sellers are able 
to identify which stocks will experience lower returns over the next twenty days.  Moreover, 
they find that non-program institutional trades earn especially low returns, a result consistent 
with the idea that short sellers trade on superior information.  Similarly, Engelberg, Reed, 
and Ringgenberg (2010) examine short volume around publicly released news articles and 
find that the negative relation between short sales and future returns is more than twice as 
strong in the presence of news.  Moreover, they find that this result is concentrated in client 
trades, not market-maker trades, a finding which lends further support to the idea that short 
sellers possess superior information.   
In a related literature, a number of papers have found that the release of data on the 
quantity of short selling is also associated with lower returns.  Senchack and Starks (1993) 
examine returns for stocks that had short interest levels published in the Wall Street Journal 
during the period 1980-1986 and they find the release of short interest data is associated with 
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a small drop in returns.  Aitken, et al. (1998) use intraday data on the Australian stock 
exchange to test the information content of short positions and they find that stocks 
immediately experience negative abnormal returns following the publication of short 
transactions.  They conclude that short positions reveal negative information.  Interestingly, 
the Aitken, et al. finding is consistent with more than one possible mechanism relating short 
sales and returns.  While Aitken, et al. interpret it as evidence that short sales reveal negative 
information, it is also consistent with the story that short sales impact returns because market 
demand curves are downward sloping and short sales alter the supply of shares outstanding.  
However, because information on short positions is instantly revealed in Australia, they are 
unable to isolate the impact of information from their analysis. 
 
2.2 Short Sales and the Volatility of Returns 
While a number of studies examine short sales and returns, relatively little has been 
done to explore the link between short sales and volatility.  In one of the few papers to 
investigate the topic, Henry and McKenzie (2006) examine 21 firms listed on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange and they find evidence that firms experience higher volatility following a 
period of short selling.  Angel, Christophe, and Ferri (2003) find that short selling has a 
positive and monotonic relation with volatility, although they note that additional research 
regarding the possible lead/lag relation between short sales and volatility is still needed.  In 
other words, their results do not explain the nature of the relation between short sales and 
volatility and it is unclear if: 1) short selling leads to volatility, 2) volatility leads to short 
selling, or 3) both short selling and volatility are driven by some other factor. 
10 
 
More recently, Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) investigate the trading strategies used 
by short sellers and they theorize that short sellers may act as opportunistic risk bearers on 
days with high volatility.  They proxy for volatility using the intraday (high – low)/high and 
they find evidence that short sales are positively correlated with contemporaneous volatility, 
however they view this as evidence that short sellers are opportunistic risk bearers, not that 
short sales lead to increased volatility. 
Finally, Kaplan, Moskowitz, and Sensoy (2009) work with a money manager to 
exogenously shift the supply of lendable shares for certain stocks and they find mixed 
evidence on the relation between short sales and volatility.  While they find no difference in 
volatility between stocks available for lending versus stocks not available for lending in their 
experiment, they do find some evidence that stocks with high short interest are associated 
with increased volatility.  Nevertheless, their study focuses primarily on the impact of a 
change to the supply of lendable shares and not on the impact of short selling itself. 
 
2.3 Heterogeneous Beliefs 
Early asset pricing models typically assumed that all investors possessed 
homogeneous expectations.  For instance, the now ubiquitous capital asset pricing model 
(Sharpe (1964, Lintner (1965)) assumes that investors possess identical estimates of the 
expected risk and return for every asset.
8
  More recently, however, economists have begun to 
examine both the validity of this assumption and the implications that result from relaxing it.  
                                                 
8
Mayshar (1983) provides several quotations from both Sharpe and Lintner explaining their belief that the 
assumption of homogeneous expectations is without loss of generality.  From Sharpe (1970, p. 113), “…a 
model based on disagreement has little value in a positive role.”  From Lintner (1969, p. 371), “Any carryover 
of…Ricardian notations of „marginal‟ buyers setting prices in purely competitive markets is utterly unjustified 
and misleading when dealing with security markets under uncertainty.  Every investor is a marginal holder with 
respect to his last share…of each security he holds.” 
11 
 
In a widely cited article, Miller (1977) presents a verbal model that argues that heterogeneous 
investor beliefs will influence equilibrium asset prices when short selling is restricted in the 
marketplace.  In a related article, Mayshar (1983) elaborates on the ideas presented in Miller 
(1977) and argues that early asset pricing models overlooked the importance of 
heterogeneous beliefs because they did not recognize that investor participation in the market 
for each stock is endogenous.  When short selling is restricted or costly, only the most 
optimistic investors will choose to participate in the market and so each stock will tend to be 
held by the investors with the highest valuations.  As a consequence, the models argue that 
the market demand curve for each stock will be downward sloping and the equilibrium price 
will be a function of the marginal valuation.  While Miller focuses only on the marginal 
valuation, Mayshar attempts to bridge the division in the literature by showing that 
equilibrium prices are determined by both the average and the marginal investors. 
Following Miller (1977), a number of models have expanded the literature on 
heterogeneous beliefs and short sale constraints.  Jarrow (1980) builds upon Miller‟s model 
and notes that it is important to consider dispersion in expectations regarding the covariance 
of future asset prices, not just the mean expectations.  Varian (1985) analyzes the impact of 
divergence of opinion in an Arrow-Debreu contingent claims model and finds that higher 
dispersion in beliefs will likely be associated with reduced prices.  Xu (2007) develops a 
model that predicts increased skewness in the presence of short sale constraints when 
investors possess differing beliefs.  Finally, Harrison and Kreps (1978) use heterogeneous 
expectations to show that short sale constraints can lead to prices that are above the 
valuations of even the most optimistic investors.  The Harrison and Kreps model can be 
12 
 
viewed as an explanation of speculative bubbles under the assumption that investors possess 
bounded rationality. 
The heterogeneous beliefs literature commonly assumes bounded rationality and at 
least some limit to arbitrage, often in the form of short sales constraints.  Many of the models 
allow the existence of heterogeneous expectations by assuming bounded rationality in the 
sense that investors view their own signal as more informative than the signal they receive 
from prices.  Davis, Pagano, and Schwartz (2007) provide a number of examples regarding 
the validity of the assumption of heterogeneous beliefs in financial markets.  For example, 
they note that analyst recommendations about a particular stock often disagree and the fact 
that most stocks have both long and short volume is suggestive of disagreement.  Assuming 
that at least some long and short investors trade for reasons other than hedging or liquidity, 
then the mere fact that long and short investors agree to disagree is evidence of 
heterogeneous expectations. 
Moreover, the assumption of limits to arbitrage due to short sale constraints seems 
likely to represent a reasonable depiction of true market conditions. Fabozzi (2004, pg 235) 
provides an overview of the many constraints to short selling that exist including: the cost of 
borrowing shares, the difficulty locating and establishing an equity loan position, the risk that 
a short position will not be maintained due to recall risk, margin requirements, the fact that 
short sellers do not receive the proceeds of the sale, and legal and institutional restrictions on 
short selling.
9
 
                                                 
9
For example, many mutual funds are precluded from participating in short transactions.  Almazan, Brown, 
Carlson, and Chapman (2004) find that 73% and 66% of mutual funds were restricted from engaging in short 
sales in 1994 and 2000, respectively.  Moreover, of those allowed to short, only 10% actually did use short 
transactions. 
13 
 
To date, the empirical asset pricing literature has largely utilized heterogeneous belief 
models to explain specific stylized facts.  For example, Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin 
(2001) find that volume is a significant predictor of future returns and they theorize that this 
might be due to the increased visibility that results from trading volume which in turn leads 
to a change in the demand and price as postulated in Miller (1977).  Similarly, Diether, 
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) find that higher dispersion in analyst forecasts is associated 
with lower future returns, a result also predicted by Miller (1977).  In this paper, I provide a 
novel direct test of heterogeneous belief models.  While the tests and findings in this paper 
are consistent with a broad class of heterogeneous belief models, in what follows I will 
specifically focus on implications from the Miller and Mayshar models.   
  
  
 
 
 
3. Theory and Methodology 
In both the Miller (1977) and the Mayshar (1983) models, investor participation in the 
market for each stock is endogenous and it is assumed that investors possess differing 
opinions about each stock‟s expected return.  When short selling is restricted or costly, only 
the most optimistic investors will choose to participate in the market and so each stock will 
tend to be held by the investors with the highest valuations.  As a result, the market demand 
curve for each stock will be downward sloping and the equilibrium price will be determined 
by the marginal valuation.
10
 
An interesting implication of these models is that given a downward sloping demand 
curve, a change in the quantity of shares outstanding will lead to a change in the marginal 
valuation which in turn results in a price change that is independent of the information 
environment.  Thus, heterogeneous opinion models provide a theoretical basis for the 
commonly held belief that short sales lead to return changes.  When a short sale is initiated, 
the short seller borrows a share from an existing long investor and then sells this borrowed 
share to another investor.  Even though the original investor has loaned out her share, she 
retains the principal characteristics of her original long position, including the right to receive 
                                                 
10
In these models, individual demand curves are not downward sloping.  However, the market demand curve 
can be calculated as the horizontal sum of all individual demand curves and because market participation is 
endogenously determined and investors possess different beliefs, the resulting market demand curve will be 
downward sloping. 
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all cash flow distributions.
11
  Moreover, the investor who buys the share from the short seller 
also receives the characteristics of a long position.  In a sense, one share has become two 
shares and thus the opening (closing) of a short position can be viewed as a positive 
(negative) supply shock.
12
  If market demand curves are in fact downward sloping due to 
heterogeneous investor beliefs then the supply shock that results from a short sale will cause 
returns to change. 
Accordingly, I propose and test a previously unexplored implication that follows from 
the Miller and Mayshar models: the idea that short sales lead to increased volatility because 
they change the effective supply of shares outstanding.  The Miller (1977) model suggests 
that an increase (decrease) in the number of shares outstanding will be associated with a 
decrease (increase) in contemporaneous returns.  Because the opening and closing of a short 
position leads to an increase and decrease in the supply of shares outstanding, respectively, it 
follows that short sales will lead to return changes.  Unfortunately, one of the most widely 
used measures of short transactions, short volume, only provides information about the 
opening of short positions.  Thus, short volume data cannot be used to examine the round-trip 
impact of a short transaction in order to test for a relation with volatility.  While the other 
widely used measure of short transactions, short interest, does provide information about the 
closing of positions, it is typically available at only the monthly or semi-monthly frequency.  
These data limitations might help explain why there has been relatively little work 
investigating the relation between short sales and the volatility of returns. 
                                                 
11
The original owner of the share retains the right to participate in any corporate actions that occur while the 
share is on loan, including tender offers and dividend distributions.  However, although the original owner of 
the share does not retain voting rights while the share is on loan, she is generally allowed to recall the share at 
any time and for any reason, including recalling shares in order to participate in votes.  For a detailed 
discussion, see Fabozzi (2004). 
 
12
While the impact of short sales on the supply of shares is not directly modeled in the heterogeneous beliefs 
literature, Miller (1977) acknowledges that, “...short selling increases the effective supply.” 
16 
 
In this paper, I use daily firm-level data on the quantity of shares demanded and 
supplied in the equity loan market in order to examine the relation between short sales and 
returns.  By using equity loan quantities, I can measure the opening and closing of short 
transactions at a daily frequency. 
  
  
 
 
 
4. Data 
4.1 Equity Loan Data 
The equity loan database used in this study comes from Data Explorers, a leading 
provider of data in the equity loan market.  In the normal course of its business, Data 
Explorers aggregates and distributes information regarding equity loan positions at the daily 
frequency.  The data is sourced directly from a wide variety of contributing customers 
including beneficial owners, hedge funds, investment banks, lending agents, and prime 
brokers. 
 The database contains a number of statistics summarizing transactions in the equity 
loan market at the stock-day level.  Specifically, the database used in this study includes the 
following information: the date, a stock identifier, the quantity of shares loaned out 
(LoanQty), the quantity of shares available to be borrowed (LoanSupply), the utilization rate, 
and the cost of borrowing a share.  The utilization rate is the quantity of shares loaned out as 
a percentage of shares available to be borrowed and the cost of borrowing a share is 
measured in deciles. 
To construct the sample, Data Explorers selected the 1,500 largest U.S. stocks in their 
database over the period January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2009 and the resulting 
sample contains 1,157,016 daily observations.  Panel A of Table 1 provides summary 
statistics for the equity loan database.  The mean (median) loan quantity as a percentage of 
shares outstanding is 6.51% (4.33%) and the mean (median) loan supply as a percentage of 
shares outstanding is 26.13% (26.77%).  For the typical firm, the utilization rate is 
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approximately 22% (15%) and the cost of borrowing a share falls in the lowest price decile.  
Interestingly, these statistics suggests that for most firms the market contains an excess 
supply of shares available to be borrowed even though the cost of borrowing a share is 
relatively low. 
Combined, the market participants that contribute to this database account for a 
substantial portion of all equity loans in the marketplace.  Panel B of Table 1 examines the 
correlation between the equity loan quantity in the database and two common measures of 
short sales, short volume and short interest.  The mean (median) correlation between equity 
loan quantity and semi-monthly short interest from Compustat is 0.70 (0.78), a finding which 
suggests that the equity loan quantity in this database does represent a significant portion of 
total equity loan volume.  Interestingly, the correlation between equity loan quantity and 
short volume is significantly lower at 0.11 (0.10).  However, one of the important features of 
loan quantity in this database is that it makes it possible to ascertain not just when a short 
position is initiated, but also when it is closed.  In contrast, short volume represents only 
newly initiated short transactions. 
In this study I use equity loan quantities as a measure of short selling.  Accordingly, it 
is important to consider the potential impact of security settlement procedures.  Typically, 
equity transactions in the U.S. are settled within three business days of the trade, often 
referred to as T+3.  Thus, when a short seller initiates a position, she must borrow and deliver 
the shares by T+3.  Because a short seller must pay a fee each day to borrow a security, the 
short seller is likely to borrow the share on or as close to T+3 as possible (Geczy, Musto, and 
Reed (2002)).  Thus, to match equity loan transactions to the occurrence of an underlying 
short sale, I shift equity loan transactions back by three days.  To make it clear that loan 
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quantity is a measure of short selling that occurred on day T, throughout the paper I will 
consistently refer to equity loan quantity that has been shifted back by three days as 
LoanQtyt. 
 
4.2 Data Compilation 
I combine the equity loan database with data from Compustat, CRSP, and TAQ.  
From Compustat, I add the log of the book to market ratio as of the end of the previous 
quarter.  From CRSP, I add daily returns, price, volume, and shares outstanding.  I also add 
the daily value weighted market return and the daily bid-ask spread as a fraction of the 
closing mid-price.  I calculate Size as the log of the mean market capitalization for each firm 
over the previous quarter.   
I calculate daily realized volatility using the sum of squared five minute returns as in 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001).  Specifically, for each firm i on day t, I 
calculate the following: 
 
RVi,t =     
   
    
(1) 
where rt,m represents the five minute continuously compounded return from TAQ calculated 
over the 78 five-minute intervals that occur during regular trading hours.  I exclude all 
cancelled and invalid trades in TAQ.  In the analyses that follow, I use the natural logarithm 
of the realized volatility measure constructed above. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
5.  Analyses and Results 
As previously discussed, there are a number of possible mechanisms that link short 
sales and returns.  As argued by Clark (1973) in his well-known mixture of distributions 
hypothesis, trading volume and returns are necessarily related due to their common 
dependence on latent information.  However, in this study I aim to isolate the impact that 
short selling has on returns due to the supply shocks that result from equity loans.  Thus, in 
order to test for this relation while controlling for latent information, I employ an 
instrumental variables (IV) regression framework.  I use data on the equity lending market in 
tandem with the instrumental variables framework in order to examine both the level and 
volatility of returns. 
 
5.1 Motivation for Potential Instruments 
The IV analysis answers the question: but for the actions of short sellers, what would 
the level and volatility of equity returns look like?  The first step in any IV analysis is to find 
a suitable set of instrumental variables.  To be a valid instrument, a variable needs to possess 
the following properties: (1) it must be correlated with the endogenous regressor, and (2) it 
must not itself belong in the explanatory model of interest.  Here, these properties require 
that the instruments are correlated with short sales (as measured by loan quantity) and at the 
same time, the instruments are not a necessary component of any model the purports to 
explain the level or the volatility of returns. 
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The extant literature provides motivation for a potential instrument that satisfies these 
conditions.  D‟Avolio (2002) notes that, “short-run [equity loan] supply is essentially 
vertical.  This is due to a separation of authority at many fund complexes between portfolio 
allocation and lending and by the lack of high frequency transparency in loan rates…”  In 
other words, because loan desks are often run separately from allocation desks, it is likely 
that short-term equity loan supply is largely exogenous from the factors that determine 
returns.  As a consequence, the evidence suggests that the supply of shares available to be 
borrowed (hereafter, “loan supply”) may satisfy the exclusion restriction discussed above. 
Moreover, there are a number of reasons that loan supply may change for reasons that 
are largely exogenous from returns.  For example, while the original owner of a share retains 
all cash flow rights while a share is on loan, the owner must recall the share in order to 
participate in corporate votes.  Thus, loan supply may contract around corporate votes in a 
manner that is exogenous from returns (e.g., Christoffersen, Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2007), 
Aggarwal, Saffi, and Sturgess (2010)).
13
  Similarly, Thornock (2010) finds that loan supply 
significantly contracts around ex-dividend dates as a consequence of dividend taxation 
policies.  Consistent with this finding, Figure 2 examines the equity lending market in the 20 
days before and after ex-dividend dates and finds evidence of a significant supply shift.  
Panel A of Figure 2 examines standardized loan supply, where standardized loan supply is 
loan supply as a percentage of shares outstanding standardized to have a mean of zero and 
unit variance, and finds that abnormal loan supply drops from a high of over 2%  before the 
                                                 
13
In a survey conducted by the International Corporate Governance Network (Lintstock (2004)), large 
institutional investors were asked if they ever recalled shares solely for voting purposes.  Of the 31 survey 
participants who had lent shares, 4 respondents had a policy of always recalling shares around votes, 2 more 
respondents often recalled shares around votes, depending on the importance of the issues to be decided, and 2 
respondents had a policy against recalling lent shares merely to vote them.  21 of the respondents recalled 
shares around votes in special circumstances. 
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ex-dividend date to a low of less than -2% on the ex-dividend date.  Moreover, Panel B 
documents a sharp increase in the loan fee around this same time period.  The results suggest 
that ex-dividend dates lead to a significant shift in loan supply that is likely to be exogenous 
from the factors that determine returns. 
While the evidence suggests that loan supply is likely to satisfy the exclusion 
restriction, for loan supply to be considered a potential instrument it must also be correlated 
with the quantity borrowed by short sellers (hereafter, “loan quantity”).  D‟Avolio (2002) 
notes that supply shifts, in particular loan recalls, can often prevent short sellers from 
maintaining their short positions: “Having been recalled, the mean (median) time before the 
short can be reestablished with the lender is 23 (nine) trading days… The resulting 
sluggishness explains numerous accounts by professional short sellers of not being able to 
reestablish recalled loans „at any price.‟”  Similarly, Kolasinski et al. (2010) provide 
additional evidence on the relation between loan supply and loan quantity in a study that 
examines equity lending across multiple lenders.  They find evidence that the loan market is 
highly fragmented and that search costs make it difficult for short sellers to establish 
positions with different lenders.  As a result, changes to the supply of shares at one lender, 
even if they represent a small change relative to the market supply of shares, may 
significantly influence the ability of investors to maintain or establish a short sale in the near 
term.  Combined, the evidence discussed above suggests that not only is loan supply likely to 
be largely exogenous from the factors that determine returns, it is also likely to be correlated 
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with the quantity borrowed by short sellers.  Accordingly, I consider loan supply as a 
potential instrument.
14
 
As shown by Kolasinski et al. (2010), the opaque and fragmented structure of the 
equity lending market may make it difficult for short sellers to establish positions with 
different lenders.  When loan supply is relatively low, small changes to it may have a 
considerable impact on the loan quantity borrowed.  On the other hand, when loan supply is 
relatively high, the loan quantity borrowed may be less sensitive to changes in supply.  Due 
to this potential non-linearity, I also consider the square of loan supply as an instrument. 
In the instrumental variables analyses that follow in sections 5.2 and 5.3, I provide 
formal tests on the validity of these instruments.  However, as a motivational experiment, I 
first investigate the relation between loan supply and public news events.  There is a growing 
literature that finds that public news events are related to equity returns and volume (e.g., 
Antweiler and Frank (2006), Tetlock (2008), Engelberg et al. (2010), etc.).  Accordingly, by 
examining the relation between loan supply and news, it is possible to see if loan supply is 
exogenous from at least one significant determinant of equity returns. 
Table 2 presents the results of four different panel data regressions of the form: 
 yi,t = α + β1Newsi,t + β2LoanQtyi.t + β3Bid-Aski,t + β4B/Mi,q-1 + β5Sizei,q-1 
+ β6MarketRett-1 + β7Reti,t-1 + β8Reti,t-2 + FE + εi,t 
(2) 
 
where the dependent variable yi,t is: (1) LoanSupplyi,t, (2) LoanSuppl    
 , (3) Returnsi,t, or (4) 
Volumei,t.  Newsi,t measures the number of negative words in a news article as a fraction of 
total words according to the negative word list developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
                                                 
14
Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010) also use loan supply as an instrumental variable in an analysis that examines how 
stock price efficiency is affected by short sale constraints.  While they find that short sale constraints impact the 
efficiency of stock prices at the weekly and monthly frequency, their results are consistent with the idea that 
loan supply is largely exogenous from contemporaneous returns. 
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and data on news articles is from the Dow Jones News Archive as in Engelberg et al. (2010).  
Each regression investigates the impact of public news events on the variable of interest and I 
include firm fixed effects with robust standard errors clustered by firm in order to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity and correct for heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation. 
In order to be a suitable instrument, loan supply should be related to equity returns 
only through the endogenous regressor, loan quantity.  Accordingly, I include loan quantity 
in models 1 and 2 in order to examine the relation between public news and loan supply after 
including the impact of loan quantity.  For consistency, I also include loan quantity in models 
3 and 4.  In addition, I include firm size (Size), book to market (B/M), lagged firm returns 
(Reti,t-1, Reti,t-2), and the lagged value weighted market return (MarketRett-1) in order to 
control for well-documented relations between these variables and equity returns.   Size is 
calculated as the log of the mean market capitalization for each firm over the previous 
quarter from CRSP and B/M is calculated as the log of the book to market ratio for each firm 
as of the end of the previous quarter from Compustat.  Finally, in order to control for the 
impact of liquidity, I include the bid-ask spread (Bid-Ask) from CRSP, calculated daily as a 
fraction of the closing mid-price.   
The extant literature suggests that news events will be related to returns and volume, 
however, if loan supply is exogenous from the factors that determine returns then loan supply 
should not be influenced by public news events.  The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on News in model 3 suggests that news articles with a high percentage of negative 
words are negatively related to returns.  In other words, negative news is strongly associated 
with negative contemporaneous returns at the daily frequency, a finding consistent with the 
existing literature.   Similarly, the significant coefficient of 6.7934 on News in model 4 
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implies that a one unit increase in negative news events is associated with a 6.8% increase in 
volume as a percentage of shares outstanding.  Importantly, as theorized above, both loan 
supply and loan supply squared appear to be largely unaffected by public news events.  
While loan supply does exhibit a relation with past market and firm returns, the fact that it is 
not related to contemporaneous news events that are known to impact contemporaneous 
returns and volume is evidence that it may satisfy the exclusion restriction.  Accordingly, I 
use LoanSupply and LoanSupply
2
 as instruments to identify the relation between returns and 
supply shocks that result from equity loans. 
In the instrumental variable results discussed below, I provide additional tests that 
examine if loan supply is adequately correlated with loan demand and validly excluded from 
the model of interest.   
 
5.2 Level of Returns 
I begin by examining the relation between short sales and the level of returns.  As 
previously discussed, the Miller (1977) model implies that heterogeneous beliefs will lead to 
a downward sloping market demand curve.  This leads to an interesting implication, namely, 
that an exogenous change in the supply of shares will lead to a change in marginal valuation 
which in turn results in a price change.  Thus, heterogeneous belief models provide a 
theoretical basis for the commonly held belief that short sales cause returns to change.  In this 
section, I seek to investigate this theory using an instrumental variables analysis and I find 
evidence that short sales do impact the level of returns in a manner that is independent from 
the latent information flow.   
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To investigate the theorized relation between short sales and returns, I estimate the 
following system of equations: 
 LoanQtyi,t = β1LoanSupplyi,t + β2LoanSuppl    
 + β3Bid-Aski,t + β4B/Mi,q−1 + 
β5Sizei,q−1 + β6MarketRett−1 + β7Reti,t−1 + β8Reti,t−2 + FE + εi,t 
 
Reti,t = β1           + β2Bid-Aski,t + β3B/Mi,q−1 + β4Sizei,q−1 + β5MarketRett−1 + 
β6Reti,t−1 + β7Reti,t−2 + FE + εi,t 
(3) 
 
 
(4) 
 
where LoanSupply and LoanSupply
2
 are the excluded instruments and         is the fitted 
value of LoanQty from equation (3).  The system uses shocks to loan supply to identify the 
impact that short sales (as measured by daily loan quantity) have on contemporaneous 
returns. 
In order to ensure that my results are not impacted by a weak instrument problem, I 
present the results of the first stage regression in addition to the second stage results.  
Specifically, Table 3 presents the results from equation (3) and Table 4 presents the results 
from equation (4).  I begin by estimating a parsimonious model that examines the impact of 
loan quantity on returns without including additional control variables.  Models 1 and 2 
present the results without and with fixed effects, respectively.  In both models, the fitted 
value of LoanQty in Table 4 is negatively related to contemporaneous returns and the results 
are significant at the 1% level.  Consequently, the results suggest that an increase (decrease) 
in the quantity of short sales leads to a decrease (increase) in returns that same day.   
Because there are a number of variables that have been shown to impact short sales 
and returns, I next add several control variables to the specification.  I add the daily bid-ask 
spread as a fraction of the closing mid-price (Bid-Ask) in order to control for liquidity effects 
documented by Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) and I add two lags of daily returns (Ret) to 
control for the response of short sellers to previous returns as shown in Diether, Lee, and 
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Werner (2009).  To control for the well-documented relation between returns and the book-
to-market ratio, firm size, and the market return, I also add these three variables to the 
specification.  Specifically, I add the log of the book to market ratio for each firm as of the 
end of the previous quarter from Compustat (B/M), the log of the mean market capitalization 
for each firm over the previous quarter from CRSP (Size), and the value-weighted market 
return from CRSP (MarketRet).  In order to avoid adding an additional endogenous regressor 
to the system of equations, I use the market return as of the previous trading day.  Finally, I 
add a firm fixed effect to models 2 and 4 in order to control for possible unobserved 
heterogeneity at the firm level and in all models I use robust standard errors clustered by firm 
and date. 
After including these control variables I find that the negative contemporaneous 
relation between short sales and returns remains intact.  Models 3 and 4 present the results 
without and with fixed effects, respectively.  The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient estimate on LoanQty in model 4 of Table 4 suggests that a one standard deviation 
increase (decrease) in the quantity of shares sold short is associated with a negative (positive) 
10.94 basis point change in daily returns.
15
  Because the IV framework allows for inference 
that is independent of the latent information process, I interpret this result causally.  In other 
words, ceteris paribus, an increase in short sales causes a negative change in returns.  Thus, 
the results shed new light on the commonly held belief that short sellers are able to change 
returns. 
Of course, in order to make a valid inference from an IV framework, it necessary that 
the instruments satisfy both the weak instrument and the exclusion properties.  The first stage 
results shown in Table 3 demonstrate that LoanSupply does in fact have a statistically 
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10.94 bps = -0.0163 * 6.76%.  Annualized, this amounts to 27.56% = -0.0163 * 6.76% * 252. 
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significant relation with LoanQty.  In all models, the F-statistic strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis that the excluded instruments are weak.  In addition, for each model in Table 4 I 
examine whether or not the excluded instruments are suitably independent of the error 
process in order to ensure that they satisfy the exclusion restriction.  In all cases, the Sargan–
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the null that the instruments are 
valid.  Accordingly, I conclude that the instruments satisfy the necessary conditions and the 
inferences discussed above are valid.  
The results not only confirm that short sales impact contemporaneous returns, but 
they also provide novel evidence on the mechanism that leads to this relation.  While a 
number of studies have shown evidence of a negative correlation between short sales and 
returns, the existing literature has yet to disentangle the impact of information from the 
relation.  While it is likely that multiple mechanisms play a role in the relation between short 
sales and returns, here, the results provide evidence of a relatively unexplored mechanism 
that follows from the Miller (1977) model.  Specifically, the results suggest that one of the 
ways that short sales impact returns is by increasing the effective supply of shares 
outstanding.   
As previously discussed, the Miller (1977) model assumes that investor participation 
in the market for each stock is endogenous and investors possess differing opinions about 
each stock‟s return.  As a result, in Miller‟s model the market demand curve for each stock is 
downward sloping.  Given a downward sloping demand curve, changes to the supply of 
shares will impact returns.  The results in Table 4 provide novel evidence that supply shocks 
resulting from short sales do in fact impact returns.  However, if short sales impact returns as 
a result of supply shocks in combination with downward sloping demand curves, then firms 
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with more steeply downward sloping demand curves should be more sensitive to short sales.  
This observation provides the motivation for my next test. 
There are a number of models that generate downward sloping market demand 
curves.  For example, the well known Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model posits that 
following a supply shock, uniformed investors may incorrectly interpret price changes as 
coming from adjustments to the information set of informed investors.  As a consequence, 
supply increases will lead to price drops.  By contrast, in the Miller (1977) model market 
demand curves are downward sloping as a result of divergence in investor opinions.  As these 
opinions become more (less) diverse, the market demand curve will become steeper 
(shallower).  Thus, all else equal, firms with investors that have more diverse beliefs should 
be more sensitive to the supply shock that results from short sales. 
In order to test if the results in Table 4 are indeed a result of downward sloping 
demand curves as predicted in the Miller (1977) model, I calculate analyst dispersion as in 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) and I group firms into quintiles based on analyst 
dispersion.  I then re-estimate the system shown in equations (3) and (4) using analyst 
dispersion as a proxy for divergence in investor beliefs.  To investigation whether firms with 
higher divergence in investor beliefs are more sensitive to short sales, I estimate the system 
separately for each of the analyst dispersion quintiles.  If the predictions of the Miller model 
hold, then the impact of supply shocks should be most pronounced for firms in quintile 5, 
when divergence in investor beliefs is highest and market demand curves are steepest.   
The results, presented in Table 5, provide strong evidence that short sales impact 
returns as a result of downward sloping market demand curves as posited by Miller (1977).  
For firms with the highest analyst dispersion, the negative relation between short sales and 
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returns is nearly three times larger.  In quintile five, a one standard deviation increase 
(decrease) in the quantity of shares on loans is associated with a negative (positive) 27.58 
basis point change in daily returns and the result is significant at the 1% level.
16
  Moreover, 
the result is also strong for firms in the second highest quintile of analyst dispersion where a 
one standard deviation increase (decrease) in the quantity of shares on loans is associated 
with a negative (positive) 17.64 basis point change in daily returns.
17
  By contrast, quintiles 1 
through 3 display no significant relation between short sales and returns.  In fact, not only are 
the coefficients not statistically significant at even the 10% level, but they are an order of 
magnitude smaller than those presented in quintiles 4 and 5. 
As before, in order to make a valid inference from an IV framework, it necessary that 
the instruments satisfy both the weak instrument and the exclusion properties.  The first stage 
results, available upon request, confirm that LoanSupply does in fact have a statistically 
significant relation with LoanQty.  Moreover, for every specification in Table 5 the Sargan–
Hansen test fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid.  Accordingly, I conclude that 
the instruments satisfy the necessary conditions and the inferences discussed above are valid.  
These results are consistent with the theory that short sales impact returns as a result 
of supply shocks.  In addition, the results provide novel empirical evidence that 
heterogeneous expectations influence returns and influence the shape of the market demand 
curve.  However, it is important to note that the theory and results presented herein suggest a 
symmetric relation between short sales and returns.  In other words, if demand curves are 
downward sloping, an increase in the supply of shares should be associated with lower 
returns and a decrease in the supply of shares should be associated with higher returns.  Thus, 
                                                 
16
27.58 bps = -0.0411 * 6.76%.  Annualized, this amounts to 69.50% = -0.0411 * 6.76% * 252. 
 
17
17.64 bps = -0.0261 * 6.76%.  Annualized, this amounts to 44.46% = -0.0261 * 6.76% * 252. 
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while the results provide evidence that short sales impact returns in a manner that is unrelated 
to latent information they also suggest that, ceteris paribus, the round trip impact of a short 
sale should be zero. 
As noted by Seneca (1967) in an early empirical paper examining the link between 
short sales and returns, “Some traders see a favorable reaction [to high short interest], 
claiming that increases in short sales represent a boost to potential demand because 
eventually these positions must be covered…Others see a bearish effect and view high short 
interest conditions as a signal of pessimism and a judgment that a down-turn is likely.”  Thus, 
the results in this study provide empirical evidence that reconciles two long standing 
conflicting beliefs about the impact of short sales.  While the opening of a short sale is 
associated with lower contemporaneous returns, the closing of a short position is associated 
with higher contemporaneous returns. 
Interestingly, this fact also suggests that short sales will impact the volatility of 
returns.  As short positions open and close, the results suggest that they shift the supply curve 
back and forth, causing returns to change.  Thus, ceteris paribus, higher amounts of short 
selling should be associated with higher volatility. 
 
5.3 Volatility of Returns 
There is relatively little known about the relation between short sales and the 
volatility of returns.  As a result, I employ several different analyses in order to examine both 
the general relation and the impact that occurs after controlling for latent information flow.  I 
begin by conducting a simple sorting exercise that examines the relation between short sales 
and daily realized volatility.  As before, I measure short sales using daily loan quantity as a 
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percentage of shares outstanding and each day I group firms into deciles using this measure.  
I then calculate the mean and median daily realized volatility for each decile, where realized 
volatility is the sum of squared five minute returns from TAQ as shown in equation (1) in 
Section 4.2.  The results, shown in Figure 1, provide evidence of a positive and monotonic 
relation between short sales and volatility.  For firms in the highest decile of short sales, the 
mean (median) realized volatility is 30% (37%) higher than for firms in the lowest decile. 
In order to examine if this relation is statistically significant, I next turn to the 
conventional GARCH framework introduced by Bollerslev (1986).  I augment the standard 
GARCH(1,1) model with an additional term, |ΔLoanQtyt|, that measures changes in loan 
quantity.  Because volatility measures absolute changes in returns, I calculate the absolute 
value of changes in loan quantity as well.  In other words, since the opening of a short 
position is associated with lower returns and the closing of a position is associated with 
higher returns, I expect both increases and decreases in loan quantity to be associated with 
higher volatility.  Accordingly, I estimate the following time-series regression for each firm: 
 rett = m +    εt  
ht = ω + α(rt-1 – m)
2
 + βht-1 + γ|ΔLoanQtyt| 
(5) 
(6) 
where rett is the daily return for each firm from CRSP. 
Table 6 presents the results.  Model 1 displays the estimates for a traditional 
GARCH(1,1) model while model 2 displays the results for the augmented model including 
loan quantity as an additional regressor in the volatility equation.  The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on loan quantity in model 2 suggests that short sales are 
associated with higher contemporaneous volatility at the daily frequency.  Moreover, the 
coefficient estimate for the conditional error variance, β, is more than 3% lower in model 2, a 
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result which suggests that loan quantity has picked up some of the predictive power of the 
conditional variance.  Thus, the results confirm the link between short sales and 
contemporaneous volatility shown in Figure 1. 
Although the GARCH results strongly suggest that short sales are associated with 
higher volatility, they do not explain the source of this relation.  It is unclear, a priori, if short 
selling occurs for reasons that are exogenous from volatility; in fact, short selling may occur 
as a result of it.  For instance, while short sales can be used for speculative purposes, they are 
often utilized for hedging reasons.  Figlewski and Webb (1993) find that short sales increase 
following the introduction of traded options and Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) argue that this 
effect stems from market makers tendency to hedge their option exposures using short sales.  
Thus, it is possible that short sales and volatility are associated as a result of option trading 
and not because of the relation theorized in the Miller (1977) model.  Moreover, a number of 
papers have shown evidence that short sellers benefit from an asymmetric information 
advantage (e.g., Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008), (2010); Engelberg, Reed, and 
Ringgenberg (2010)).  If this asymmetric information leads to increased uncertainty then the 
trades of short sellers might be associated with increased volatility.  Similarly, the mixture of 
distributions hypothesis also suggests that trading volume and the volatility of returns will be 
related as a consequence of their common dependence on latent information. 
Accordingly, in order to test if the relation between short sales and volatility is a 
result of supply shocks in tandem with downward sloping demand curves, I again turn to an 
instrumental variables framework, this time using realized volatility as the dependent 
variable in the second stage equation.  As before, I calculate realized volatility as the sum of 
squared five minute returns from TAQ and I measure the impact of short sales using the 
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absolute value of changes in loan quantity.  In order to ensure that my instruments are 
adequately correlated with the endogenous regressor, I also calculate the absolute difference 
of the instruments.  Specifically, I use the absolute value of changes in LoanSupply and the 
square of the absolute change in LoanSupply as instruments. 
I then estimate the following system of equations: 
 |ΔLoanQtyi,t| = β1|ΔLoanSupplyi,t| + β2ΔLoanSuppl    
 + β3RVi,t-1 + β4RVi,w-1 + 
β5RVi,m-1 + β6Bid-Aski,t + β7Sizei,m-1 + β8VIXt + FE + εi,t  
 
RVi,t = β1           +β2RVi,t-1 +β3RVi,w-1 +β4RVi,m-1 +β5Bid-Aski,t + β6Sizei,m-1 + 
β7VIXt +FE +εi,t 
(7) 
 
 
(8) 
 
where |ΔLoanSupply| and ΔLoanSupply2 are the excluded instruments and Δ        is the 
fitted value of |ΔLoanQty| from equation (7).  The system uses shocks to loan supply to 
identify the impact that short sales (as measured by changes in daily loan quantity) have on 
contemporaneous realized volatility. 
 In order to account for the well-documented autoregressive property of volatility, I 
include three lags of realized volatility.  Specifically, I adopt the Heterogeneous 
Autoregressive Realized Volatility (HAR-RV) class of models as developed by Corsi 
(2009).
18
  Following Corsi (2009), I calculate the one day lag of realized volatility and I 
calculate weekly and monthly measures of past volatility as the time-series mean realized 
volatility over the previous five and twenty-two days, respectively, as shown in equations (9) 
and (10) below.   
 RVi,w-1 =  
 
 
       t-j 
 
RVi,m-1 =  
 
  
        t-j 
(9) 
 
 
(10) 
                                                 
18
Several other versions of the HAR-RV model have been proposed including models developed by Andersen, 
Bollerslev, and Diebold (2007) and Bollerslev, Kretschmer, Pigorsch, and Tauchen (2009).  In this analysis, I 
focus on the parsimonious model first proposed by Corsi in 2004 and published in 2009. 
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The results from equations (7) and (8) are presented in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.  I 
include a firm fixed effect in models 2 and 4 and in all models I use robust standard errors 
clustered by firm and date.  The results in models 1 and 2 of Table 8 suggest that absolute 
changes in LoanQty are positively related to realized volatility, a result consistent with the 
predictions of the Miller (1977) model.  The statistically significant coefficient of 0.2105 on 
LoanQty in model 1 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the absolute change of 
LoanQty is associated with an increase in daily log realized volatility of 1.83%.
19
  Moreover, 
as expected, this effect is similar in magnitude to the effect documented in Section 5.2 for the 
level of returns.  Specifically, the 1.83% increase in log realized volatility represents 
approximately 3% of the unconditional standard deviation; for the level of returns, the 10.94 
basis point effect discussed in Section 5.2 also represents approximately 3% of the 
unconditional standard deviation of daily returns. 
As shown by Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009), short sellers may target firms as part 
of a number of different strategies.  Accordingly, in models 3 and 4 I add three additional 
controls variables.  As before, I add the daily bid-ask spread as a fraction of the closing mid-
price (Bid-Ask) in order to control for liquidity effects documented by Diether, Lee, and 
Werner (2009) and I also add the log of the mean market capitalization for each firm over the 
previous month (Size) and the log of the daily CBOE volatility index for the S&P 500 (VIX). 
The results with these additional control variables, shown in models 3 and 4, confirm 
the strong positive relation between short sales and volatility.  The statistically significant 
coefficient of 0.2001 on LoanQty in model 4 of Table 8 suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in the absolute change of LoanQty is associated with an increase in daily 
                                                 
19
1.83% = 0.2105 * 8.67%. 
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log realized volatility of 1.73%.
20
  In other words, when short sellers trade, ceteris paribus, 
their trades lead to increased volatility. 
To confirm that the instruments are valid, I display the results of the first stage 
regression in Table 7 and the results confirm that the absolute difference of LoanSupply does 
in fact have a statistically significant relation with absolute deviations in LoanQty.
21
  
Moreover, for each specification in Table 8, the Sargan–Hansen test fails to reject the null 
that the instruments are valid.  Accordingly, I conclude that the instruments satisfy the 
necessary conditions and the inferences discussed above are valid.  
In order to examine if the relation between short sales and volatility is a result of 
supply shifts in the presence of downward sloping demand curves in accordance with the 
Miller (1977) model, I then re-estimate the system shown in equations (7) and (8) separately 
for each of five subsamples based on analyst dispersion.  Just as with the level of returns 
discussed in Section 5.2, if the predictions of the Miller model are true the relation between 
short sales and volatility should be highest in quintile 5 when market demand curves are 
more steeply downward sloping. 
The results, presented in Table 9, confirm that short sales influence volatility the most 
when demand curves are more likely to have a steep downward slope.  The statistically 
significant coefficient of 0.2397 in quintile 5 indicates that a one standard deviation increase 
in the absolute change of LoanQty is associated with an increase in daily log realized 
                                                 
20
1.73% = 0.2001 * 8.67%. 
 
21
While the F-test rejects the null that the excluded instruments are jointly equal to zero in each model, the 
magnitude of the test statistic is only marginally higher than the 10% critical value in some cases.  Thus, in 
order to ensure that my results are not a result of weak instruments, I re-estimate the model using the Fuller-K 
estimator which allows for inference in the presence of weak instruments.  The results, available upon request, 
are qualitatively unchanged. 
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volatility of 2.08%.
22
  Moreover, just as with the level of returns shown in Table 5, the result 
is also strong for firms in the second highest quintile of analyst dispersion, although the 
effect is only marginally significant with a p-value of approximately 11%.  By contrast, in 
quintile 1 the magnitude of the coefficient estimate on LoanQty is an order of magnitude 
smaller and it is neither economically nor statistically significant.  In all models, the Sargan–
Hansen test fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid.  Similarly, in all models the 
first stage regression results, available upon request, confirm that the absolute difference of 
LoanSupply does in fact have a statistically significant relation with absolute deviations in 
LoanQty. 
Overall, the results confirm that in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs, short sales 
lead to increased contemporaneous volatility.  However, it is important to note this paper 
does not examine the general welfare implications of short sales.  For instance, Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang (2009) find that volatility increases and liquidity decreases when short 
sales are banned during the financial crisis of 2008.  They theorize that the short sales ban 
temporarily prevented a number of market participants, including hedge funds and 
proprietary trading desks, from providing liquidity via short sales.  Similarly, Saffi and 
Sigurdsson (2010) find that stocks that are more difficult to short are associated with 
diminished price efficiency, a finding which suggests that short sales can improve the 
efficiency of prices.  Thus, while the results in this study suggest that short sales lead to 
increased contemporaneous volatility, it is also possible that short sales help improve market 
quality and lead to lower volatility at longer horizons.  Further research is necessary in order 
to understand the interaction of these countervailing forces. 
                                                 
22
2.08% = 0.2397 * 8.67%. 
  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using an equity lending database that contains information on the quantity of shares 
demanded and supplied, I test a previously unexplored implication that follows from models 
of heterogeneous beliefs: the idea that that short sales lead to increased volatility because 
they alter the effective supply of shares in the market.  I use changes in the quantity of shares 
available to be borrowed as an instrument to identify the impact of supply shocks from short 
sales and I find evidence that these supply shocks have an effect on the level and the 
volatility of returns.  I find that a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in the quantity of 
shares sold short is associated with a negative (positive) 10.94 basis point change in daily 
returns.  Moreover, as a result of these supply shocks, I find evidence that short sales lead to 
increased contemporaneous volatility.  Specifically, I find that a one standard deviation 
increase in the absolute change of shares sold short is associated with an increase in daily 
realized volatility of 1.83%. 
In order to test if these findings are a result of downward sloping market demand 
curves as predicted by models of heterogeneous investor beliefs, I re-estimate the 
instrumental variable regressions using subsamples based on analyst dispersion, a proxy for 
heterogeneous beliefs.  The Miller (1977) model predicts that supply curves will be more 
steeply downward sloping when dispersion in investor beliefs is higher.  In accordance with 
the Miller (1977) theory, I find that the relation between short sales and both the level and 
volatility of returns is strongest in the highest quintile of analyst dispersion.  The results 
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provide strong evidence that when investors possess differing beliefs, the trades of short 
sellers lead to increased contemporaneous volatility. 
Overall, the findings contribute to three different strands of the extant literature.  
First, the paper provides new empirical evidence that changes to asset supply can impact 
returns because market demand curves for stocks are downward sloping.  Second, the paper 
confirms existing results that find a relation between heterogeneous investor beliefs and 
equity returns and moreover, it provides novel empirical evidence on how heterogeneous 
expectations influence returns and influence the shape of the market demand curve.  Finally, 
the paper sheds new light on the relation between short sales and both the level and volatility 
of equity returns. 
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Figure 1 
The Relation between Short Sales and Realized Volatility 
Figure 1 displays a graph of Realized Volatility across Loan Quantity deciles.  Loan Quantity is the quantity of shares on loan each 
day for each firm and is expressed as a percentage of shares outstanding and then grouped into deciles each day.  Realized 
Volatility is calculated as the sum of squared 5 minute returns using TAQ data as in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens 
(2001).  The solid line displays the mean value of Realized Volatility in each decile and the dashed line displays the median value. 
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Figure 2 
Equity Lending around Ex-Dividend Dates 
Figure 2 examines the equity lending market in event time around ex-dividend dates.  As a 
consequence of dividend taxation policies (e.g., Thornock (2010)), many lenders recall 
shares prior to the ex-dividend date.  Panel A displays standardized loan supply as a 
percentage of shares outstanding in the twenty days before and after the ex-dividend date 
while Panel B examines lending fees (in deciles) in the twenty days before and after the ex-
dividend date.  In each panel, the solid line represents the mean value while the dotted lines 
represent the 10% confidence bounds. 
Panel A: Loan Supply around Ex-Dividend Dates 
 
Panel B: Lending Fee around Ex-Dividend Dates 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
The database contains 1,157,016 daily observations over the period January 1, 2007 through 
December 31, 2009.  Equity loan market data is discussed in detail in Section 4 of the text.  
Loan Quantity is the quantity of shares on loan each day for each firm and Loan Supply 
Quantity is the quantity of shares available to be borrowed each day for each firm.  
Utilization Rate is the Loan Quantity as a percentage of the Loan Supply Quantity and Price 
Decile represents the cost of borrowing shares, measured in deciles.  Short Interest data is 
from Compustat and Short Volume, Daily Return, Shares Outstanding, and Volume are from 
CRSP.  B/M is the book to market ratio for each firm as of the end of the previous quarter 
from Compustat and Size is the market capitalization calculated from daily CRSP data.  
Realized Volatility is calculated as the sum of squared 5 minute returns using TAQ data as in 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001).  Panel A summarizes the equity loan 
market data at the firm level and Panel B provides an overview of the correlation between the 
total quantity on loan in the equity loan market for a given stock and two different measures 
of short sales, short volume and short interest.  Panel C summarizes the firm-level 
characteristics of the sample. 
Variable Mean Median 
1st 
Percentile 
99th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation 
      
Panel A: Equity Loan Market 
      
Loan Quantity 9.24m 4.42m 0.03m 77.83m 22.03m 
      
Loan Quantity / Shares Out 6.51% 4.33% 0.08% 30.19% 6.71% 
      
|Δ(Loan Quantity / Shares Out)| 5.66% 2.65% 0.01% 54.13% 8.67% 
      
Loan Supply Quantity 63.05m 23.87m 0.23m 707.37m 147.17m 
      
Loan Supply Quantity / Shares Out 26.13% 26.77% 0.71% 48.67% 10.49% 
      
Utilization Rate 22.41% 15.71% 0.37% 84.64% 20.80% 
      
Price Decile 1.24 1.00 1.00 6.00 0.92 
      
Panel B: Relation Between Loan Quantity and Short Sales Measures 
      
Correlation (Loan Qty, Short Volume) 0.11 0.10 -0.39 0.99 0.19 
      
Correlation (Loan Qty, Short Interest) 0.70 0.78 -0.57 0.99 0.26 
      
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
      
B/M 0.56 0.45 0.03 2.22 1.14 
      
Size $8.96b $2.58b $0.31b $129.69b $24.82b 
      
Daily Return 0.05% 0.00% -10.19% 11.04% 3.67% 
      
Volume / Shares Out 1.43% 1.00% 0.08% 7.61% 1.86% 
      
Realized Volatility 2.68% 2.17% 0.65% 9.76% 1.99% 
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Table 2 
Equity Loan Supply as a Candidate Instrument  
Table 2 displays the results of four different panel data regressions of the form: 
 
yi,t = α + β1Newsi,t + β2LoanQtyi.t + β3Bid-Aski,t + β4B/Mi,q-1 + β5Sizei,q-1 + β6MarketRett-1 +  
β7Reti,t-1 + β8Reti,t-2 + FE + εi,t 
 
where the dependent variable yi,t is: (1) LoanSupplyi,t, (2) LoanSuppl    
 ,(3) Returnsi,t, or (4) 
Volumei,t.  Returns and Volume (expressed as a percentage of shares outstanding) are from 
CRSP while LoanSupply is discussed in detail in Section 4 of the text.  News measures the 
number of negative words in a news article as a fraction of total words according to the 
negative word list developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) and the data is from the 
Dow Jones News Archive as in Engelberg et al. (2010).  LoanQty is the quantity of shares on 
loan as a fraction of shares outstanding.  Bid-Ask Spread is calculated daily as a fraction of 
the closing mid-price.  B/M is the log of the book to market ratio for each firm as of the end 
of the previous quarter from Compustat and Size is the log of the mean market capitalization 
for each firm over the previous quarter from CRSP.  MarketRett-1 is the lagged daily value-
weighted market return from CRSP and Rett-1 is the lagged return for each firm from CRSP.  
T-statistics are below the parameter estimates in italics and were calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered by firm with firm fixed effects.  *** indicates significance at the 1% 
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
  Dependent Variable 
Explanatory 
Variable  Loan Supply 
 Loan Supply 
Squared  Returns  Volume 
         
Intercept  0.0274  0.0007  0.0457***  6.8022*** 
  (0.56)  (0.01)  (17.25)  (7.06) 
News  0.0216  0.0029  -0.0276***  6.7934*** 
  (1.04)  (0.21)  (-6.73)  (11.05) 
Loan Qty  0.3828***  0.2941***  0.0031***  5.1968*** 
  (15.57)  (5.21)  (3.37)  (13.01) 
Bid-Ask Spread  -0.0866***  -0.0357*  0.0288**  7.3442*** 
  (-3.26)  (-1.77)  (2.20)  (4.30) 
B/M  -0.0006  -0.0042  0.0007***  0.1838*** 
  (-0.21)  (-1.06)  (4.58)  (3.92) 
Size  0.0141***  0.0038  -0.0030***  -0.3712*** 
  (4.08)  (0.77)  (-16.25)  (-5.61) 
Market Rett-1  -0.0147***  -0.0127***  1.1392***  -0.0459 
  (-6.78)  (-3.82)  (102.40)  (-0.59) 
Rett-1  -0.0063***  0.0014  -0.0110***  -0.5622*** 
  (-3.33)  (0.15)  (-3.81)  (-2.95) 
Rett-2  -0.0063***  -0.0057*  -0.0057***  -0.7822*** 
  (-3.78)  (-1.90)  (-2.93)  (-6.88) 
         
N  978,598  978,598  978,716  978,716 
         
R
2
  0.145  0.014  0.361  0.033 
         
Firm FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
44 
 
Table 3 
First Stage: The Relation between Equity Loans and the Level of Returns 
Table 3 displays the results of the first stage of a two stage instrumental variables panel 
regression examining the relation between equity loan quantity and the level of returns.  The 
first stage model is given by: 
 
LoanQtyi,t = β1LoanSupplyi,t + β2LoanSuppl    
 + β3Bid-Aski,t + β4B/Mi,q-1 + β5Sizei,q-1 + 
β6MarketRett-1 + β7Reti,t-1 + β8Reti,t-2 + FE + εi,t 
 
LoanQty is the quantity of shares on loan each day for each firm, expressed as a fraction of 
shares outstanding.  LoanSupply and LoanSupply
2
 are the excluded instruments.  LoanSupply 
is the quantity of shares available to be borrowed each day for each firm, expressed as a 
fraction of shares outstanding, and LoanSupply
2
 is the square of LoanSupply.  Bid-Ask 
Spread is calculated daily as a fraction of the closing mid-price.  B/M is the log of the book to 
market ratio for each firm as of the end of the previous quarter from Compustat and Size is 
the log of the mean market capitalization for each firm over the previous quarter from CRSP.  
MarketRett-1 is the lagged value weighted return on the market from CRSP and Rett-1 is the 
lagged return for each firm from CRSP.  Firm fixed effects are included in models 2 and 4.  
The F Statistic is the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments.  T-statistics 
are below the parameter estimates in italics and were calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by firm and date.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
Explanatory  Model 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Loan Supply  0.0002***  0.0004***  0.0002***  0.0004*** 
  (9.86)  (11.42)  (11.12)  (11.83) 
Loan Supply
2
  9.89 x 10
-9
  -4.49 x 10
-8
***  -4.89 x 10
-9
  -4.93 x 10
-8
*** 
  (0.30)  (-4.73)  (-0.25)  (-6.66) 
Bid-Ask Spread      0.2234  0.1780 
      (1.24)  (1.50) 
B/M      -0.0116***  -0.0055* 
      (-6.43)  (-1.72) 
Size      -0.0186***  -0.0038 
      (-8.97)  (-0.87) 
Market Rett-1      -0.0442*  -0.0395** 
      (-1.82)  (-2.46) 
Rett-1      0.0077  0.0140** 
      (0.72)  (2.10) 
Rett-2      -0.0066  0.0010 
      (-0.97)  (0.28) 
         
N  900,232  900,232  820,759  820,759 
         
F Statistic  70.43***  66.39***  67.02***  65.85*** 
         
Firm FE  No  Yes  No  Yes 
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Table 4 
Second Stage: The Relation between Equity Loans and the Level of Returns 
Table 4 displays the results of the second stage of a two stage instrumental variables panel 
regression examining the relation between equity loan quantity and the level of returns.  The 
second stage model is given by: 
 
Reti,t = β1           + β2Bid-Aski,t + β3B/Mi,q-1 + β4Sizei,q-1 + β5MarketRett-1 + β6Reti,t-1 + 
β7Reti,t-2 + FE + εi,t 
 
where Ret is the daily return for each stock from CRSP and         is the fitted value of 
LoanQty from the first stage regression shown in Table 3.  Bid-Ask Spread is calculated daily 
as a fraction of the closing mid-price.  B/M is the log of the book to market ratio for each 
firm as of the end of the previous quarter from Compustat and Size is the log of the mean 
market capitalization for each firm over the previous quarter from CRSP.  MarketRett-1 is the 
lagged value weighted return on the market from CRSP and Rett-1 is the lagged return for 
each firm from CRSP.  Firm fixed effects are included in models 2 and 4.  The Sargan – 
Hansen statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions under the null that the excluded 
instruments are suitably independent of the error process.  T-statistics are below the 
parameter estimates in italics and were calculated using robust standard errors clustered by 
firm and date.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% 
level, and * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
Explanatory  Model 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Loan Qty  -0.0110***  -0.0359***  -0.0223***  -0.0163** 
  (-2.27)  (-3.03)  (-2.67)  (-2.00) 
Bid-Ask Spread      -0.2253***  -0.2327*** 
      (-2.81)  (-2.89) 
B/M      0.0003  0.0005 
      (1.08)  (0.80) 
Size      -0.0010***  -0.0054*** 
      (-3.46)  (-4.02) 
Market Rett-1      -0.0891***  -0.0883** 
      (-2.49)  (-2.49) 
Rett-1      -0.0067  -0.0098 
      (-1.04)  (-1.55) 
Rett-2      -0.0396*  -0.0425* 
      (-1.75)  (-1.87) 
         
N  900,232  900,232  820,759  820,759 
         
Sargan – Hansen  1.5750  0.9550  2.5600  2.4050 
P-value  0.21  0.33  0.11  0.12 
         
Firm FE  No  Yes  No  Yes 
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Table 5 
Second Stage: The Relation between Equity Loans and the Level of Returns  
- By Dispersion Quintiles - 
Table 5 displays the results of the second stage of a two stage instrumental variables panel 
regression examining the relation between equity loan quantity and the level of returns.  
Analyst dispersion is ranked into quintiles and then the regression is estimated separately for 
each analyst dispersion quintile.  The second stage model is given by: 
 
Reti,t = β1           + β2Bid-Aski,t + β3B/Mi,q-1 + β4Sizei,q-1 + β5MarketRett-1 + β6Reti,t-1 + 
β7Reti,t-2 + FE + εi,t 
 
where Ret is the daily return for each stock from CRSP and         is the fitted value of 
LoanQty from the first stage regression.  Analyst dispersion is defined as in Diether, Malloy, 
and Scherbina (2002).  Bid-Ask Spread is calculated daily as a fraction of the closing mid-
price.  B/M is the log of the book to market ratio for each firm as of the end of the previous 
quarter from Compustat and Size is the log of the mean market capitalization for each firm 
over the previous quarter from CRSP.  MarketRett-1 is the lagged value weighted return on 
the market from CRSP and Rett-1 is the lagged return for each firm from CRSP.  Firm fixed 
effects are included in all models.  The Sargan – Hansen statistic is a test of overidentifying 
restrictions under the null that the excluded instruments are suitably independent of the error 
process.  T-statistics are below the parameter estimates in italics and were calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered by firm and date.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, 
** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
Explanatory  Dispersion Rank (1=Low, 5=High) 
Variable  Rank = 1  Rank = 2  Rank = 3  Rank = 4  Rank = 5 
           
Loan Qty  -0.0070  0.0015  -0.0014  -0.0261*  -0.0411*** 
  (-0.67)  (0.15)  (-0.10)  (-1.69)  (-3.04) 
Bid-Ask Spread  -0.2764**  -0.1237**  -0.2136**  -0.3977***  -0.2536*** 
  (-2.53)  (-2.56)  (-1.99)  (-3.60)  (-3.35) 
B/M  0.0019**  0.0022**  0.0029**  0.0013**  0.0009 
  (2.06)  (2.28)  (2.42)  (1.99)  (0.97) 
Size  -0.0048***  -0.0047***  -0.0045***  -0.0057***  -0.0058*** 
  (-3.41)  (-3.48)  (-3.60)  (-4.18)  (-5.54) 
Market Rett-1  -0.0896***  -0.1085***  -0.0967***  -0.0539  -0.0725 
  (-4.03)  (-4.11)  (-3.24)  (-1.06)  (-1.30) 
Rett-1  -0.0236**  -0.0023  -0.0264**  -0.0285***  0.0038 
  (-2.40)  (-0.29)  (-1.98)  (-4.59)  (0.62) 
Rett-2  -0.0574***  -0.0581**  -0.0533**  -0.0464**  -0.0260 
  (-2.93)  (-2.48)  (-2.33)  (-1.97)  (-1.13) 
           
N  165,146  166,878  165,070  163,997  159,666 
           
Sargan – Hansen  1.18  0.62  2.12  0.03  1.77 
P-value  0.28  0.43  0.15  0.87  0.18 
           
Firm FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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Table 6 
The Relation between Equity Loans and Conditional Volatility 
Table 6 displays the mean coefficient estimates from 1,468 time series GARCH(1,1) 
regressions examining the relation between equity loan quantity and the volatility of returns 
according to the following models: 
 
rett = m +    εt 
 
ht = ω + α(rt-1 – m)
2
 + βht-1 + γ|ΔLoanQtyt| 
 
Regressions are estimated separately for each firm and the mean of the cross-sectional 
estimates is reported.  Model 1 is a standard GARCH(1,1) while Model 2 augments the 
standard model by including an additional regressor, |ΔLoanQty|, in the volatility equation.  
|ΔLoanQty| is the absolute value of the percentage change in quantity of shares on loan each 
day for each firm.  T-statics are reported below the parameter estimates and were calculated 
using the standard deviation of the cross-sectional estimates as in Coval and Shumway 
(2005) and Kolasinski et al. (2010).  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
 
Explanatory  Mean of Estimates 
Variable  (1)  (2) 
     
m  9.77 x 10
-4
***  9.29 x 10
-4
*** 
  (36.01)  (34.94) 
ω  6.34 x 10-5***  4.65 x 10-5*** 
  (5.91)  (10.61) 
ARCH (α)  0.1331***  0.1388*** 
  (45.40)  (50.55) 
GARCH (β)  0.8298***  0.8024*** 
  (202.12)  (166.96) 
Loan Qty (γ)    8.20 x 10-6*** 
    (13.50) 
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Table 7 
First Stage: The Relation between Equity Loans and Realized Volatility 
Table 7 displays the results of the first stage of a two stage instrumental variables panel 
regression examining the relation between equity loan quantity and the volatility of returns.  
The first stage model is given by: 
 
|ΔLoanQtyi,t| = β1|ΔLoanSupplyi,t| + β2ΔLoanSuppl    
 + β3RVi,t-1 + β4RVi,w-1 + β5RVi,m-1 +  
β6Bid-Aski,t + β7Sizei,m-1 + β8VIXt + FE + εi,t 
 
|ΔLoanQty| is the absolute percentage change in the quantity of shares on loan each day for 
each firm, |ΔLoanSupply| and ΔLoanSupply2 are the excluded instruments.  |ΔLoanSupply| is 
the absolute percentage change in the quantity of shares available to be borrowed each day 
for each firm and ΔLoanSupply2 is the square of ΔLoanSupply.  RVi,t-1 is the lagged realized 
volatility for each firm, RVi,w-1 is the mean realized volatility over the previous week, and 
RVi,m-1 is the mean realized volatility over the previous month, as in Corsi (2009).  Bid-Ask 
Spread is calculated daily as a fraction of the closing mid-price.  Size is the log of the mean 
market capitalization for each firm over the previous month from CRSP and VIX is the log of 
the daily CBOE volatility index for the S&P 500.  Firm fixed effects are included in models 2 
and 4.  The F Statistic is the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments.  T-
statistics are below the parameter estimates in italics and were calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered by firm and date.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
Explanatory  Model 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Loan Supply  0.5052***  0.4963***  0.5251***  0.4963*** 
  (4.09)  (3.92)  (4.26)  (3.92) 
Loan Supply
2
  -0.0200***  -0.0196***  -0.0209***  -0.0196*** 
  (-4.93)  (-4.68)  (-5.17)  (-4.68) 
RVt-1  0.0099***  0.0105***  0.0095***  0.0102*** 
  (4.75)  (5.53)  (4.77)  (5.20) 
RVw-1  0.0128***  0.0134***  0.0087**  0.0111*** 
  (3.44)  (3.85)  (2.53)  (3.40) 
RVm-1  -0.0325***  -0.0251***  -0.0252***  -0.0225*** 
  (-7.70)  (-6.58)  (-5.45)  (-5.39) 
Bid-Ask Spread      0.5143**  0.1644 
      (2.45)  (1.29) 
Size      0.0110***  0.0079*** 
      (14.22)  (3.65) 
VIX      0.0115***  0.0043 
      (3.43)  (1.39) 
         
N  859,220  859,220  859,220  859,220 
         
F Statistic  16.12***   14.62***   18.00***   14.58*** 
         
Firm FE  No  Yes  No  Yes 
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Table 8 
Second Stage: The Relation between Equity Loans and Realized Volatility 
Table 8 displays the results of the second stage of a two stage instrumental variables panel 
regression examining the relation between equity loan quantity and the volatility of returns.  
The second stage model is given by: 
 
RVi,t = β1           +β2RVi,t-1+β3RVi,w-1+β4RVi,m-1+β5Bid-Aski,t+β6Sizei,m-1+β7VIXt + FE +εi,t 
 
where RV is the daily realized volatility for each stock calculated using 5 minute returns from 
TAQ as in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001) and          is the fitted 
value of |ΔLoanQtyi,t| from the first stage regression shown in Table 8.  RVi,t-1 is the lagged 
realized volatility for each firm, RVi,w-1 is the mean realized volatility over the previous week, 
and RVi,m-1 is the mean realized volatility over the previous month, as in Corsi (2009).  Bid-
Ask Spread is calculated daily as a fraction of the closing mid-price.  Size is the log of the 
mean market capitalization for each firm over the previous month from CRSP and VIX is the 
log of the daily CBOE volatility index for the S&P 500.  Firm fixed effects are included in 
models 2 and 4.  The Sargan – Hansen statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions under 
the null that the excluded instruments are suitably independent of the error process.  T-
statistics are below the parameter estimates in italics and were calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered by firm and date.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
Explanatory  Model 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
ΔLoan Qty  0.2105**  0.1802*  0.2440**  0.2001** 
  (2.09)  (1.81)  (2.43)  (1.98) 
RVt-1  0.3050***  0.3040***  0.2966***  0.2849*** 
  (20.35)  (20.33)  (20.35)  (20.44) 
RVw-1  0.4388***  0.4379***  0.4180***  0.3933*** 
  (15.53)  (15.48)  (15.64)  (15.56) 
RVm-1  0.2216***  0.2056***  0.1722***  0.0718** 
  (7.72)  (7.07)  (5.96)  (2.43) 
Bid-Ask Spread      4.7549***  4.7841*** 
      (4.13)  (4.04) 
Size      -0.0101***  -0.0069 
      (-5.93)  (-0.74) 
VIX      0.1053***  0.2217*** 
      (7.60)  (13.36) 
         
N  859,220  859,220  859,220  859,220 
         
Sargan – Hansen  0.696  0.506  1.223  1.211 
P-value  0.40  0.48  0.27  0.27 
         
Firm FE  No  Yes  No  Yes 
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Table 9 
Second Stage: The Relation between Equity Loans and Realized Volatility 
- By Dispersion Quintiles - 
Table 9 displays the results of the second stage of a two stage instrumental variables panel 
regression examining the relation between equity loan quantity and the volatility of returns.  
Analyst dispersion is ranked into quintiles and then the regression is estimated separately for 
each analyst dispersion quintile.  The second stage model is given by: 
 
RVi,t = β1           +β2RVi,t-1 + β3RVi,w-1+β4RVi,m-1+β5Bid-Aski,t+β6Sizei,m-1+β7VIXt+FE +εi,t 
 
where RV is the daily realized volatility for each stock calculated using 5 minute returns from 
TAQ as in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Ebens (2001) and          is the fitted 
value of |ΔLoanQtyi,t| from the first stage regression.  Analyst dispersion is defined as in 
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002).  RVi,t-1 is the lagged realized volatility for each firm, 
RVi,w-1 is the mean realized volatility over the previous week, and RVi,m-1 is the mean realized 
volatility over the previous month, as in Corsi (2009).  Bid-Ask Spread is calculated daily as 
a fraction of the closing mid-price.  Size is the log of the mean market capitalization for each 
firm over the previous month from CRSP and VIX is the log of the daily CBOE volatility 
index for the S&P 500.  Firm fixed effects are included in all models.  The Sargan – Hansen 
statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions under the null that the excluded instruments 
are suitably independent of the error process.  T-statistics are below the parameter estimates 
in italics and were calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm and date.  *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * 
indicates significant at the 10% level. 
Explanatory  Dispersion Rank (1=Low, 5=High) 
Variable  Rank = 1  Rank = 2  Rank = 3  Rank = 4  Rank = 5 
           
ΔLoan Qty  -0.0176  0.2437  0.0964*  0.3272  0.2397** 
  (-0.08)  (1.52)  (1.73)  (1.59)  (2.16) 
RVt-1  0.2729***  0.2712***  0.2700***  0.2839***  0.2892*** 
  (18.12)  (18.30)  (18.87)  (20.34)  (21.83) 
RVw-1  0.3565***  0.3667***  0.3790***  0.3670***  0.3783*** 
  (13.55)  (13.77)  (14.64)  (14.58)  (16.24) 
RVm-1  0.0159  0.0218  -0.0092  0.0275  0.0730*** 
  (0.46)  (0.61)  (-0.29)  (0.91)  (2.65) 
Bid-Ask Spread  7.7324***  2.1704  6.0002***  5.7912***  4.3447*** 
  (8.14)  (1.39)  (4.85)  (8.89)  (4.33) 
Size  0.0516***  0.0287  0.0131  0.0036  -0.0253*** 
  (2.68)  (1.59)  (0.95)  (0.31)  (-3.04) 
VIX  0.3154***  0.3130***  0.3212***  0.2900***  0.2303*** 
  (13.29)  (11.42)  (13.89)  (14.19)  (11.87) 
           
N  173,670  171,572  173,138  171,756  169,084 
           
Sargan – Hansen  0.385  0.239  1.689  1.961  0.098 
P-value  0.53  0.63  0.19  0.16  0.75 
           
Firm FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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